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This Essay discusses two historical parallels between the current financial
crisis and the financial crisis of the late 1920s and 1930s. First, financial
innovation was at the core of both crises. In particular, the machinations of
Ivar Kreuger illuminate how financial innovation tends to outstrip the ability,
and perhaps the willingness, of investors and intermediaries to process
information. Second, reliance on credit ratings began as a response to the 1929
crash and became a primary cause of the recent crisis. During the 1930s,
regulators developed rules based on credit ratings; those rules are the
ancestors of today's widespread regulatory reliance on ratings. Without
financial innovation and overreliance on credit ratings, the recent crisis likely
would not have occurred, and certainly would not have been as deep.
Introduction
This Essay sketches some historical parallels between the current financial
crisis and the mania, panic, crash, and aftermath of the 1920s and 1930s, with a
particular focus on two phenomena: the rise and fall of Ivar Kreuger, and the
introduction of legal rules depending substantively on credit ratings. These
parallels cast light on the financial crisis of 2008, and illustrate two theoretical
points about the function, and dysfunction, of financial markets.
First, Ivar Kreuger's machinations illuminate the importance of financial
innovation and its tendency to outstrip the ability, and perhaps the willingness,
of investors and intermediaries to process information. Merton Miller
applauded the use of financial innovation, even for regulatory arbitrage, but did
not recognize that the proliferation of financial innovation often has a dark
side.' Informational asymmetry in financial markets tends toward cyclicality: as
t George E. Barrett Professor of Law and Finance, University of San Diego School of Law.
I See MERTON H. MILLER, MERTON MILLER ON DERIVATIVES 3 (1997); see also id. at ix
(arguing that derivatives "have made the world a safer place").
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financial innovation builds, so do disclosure gaps and misunderstandings.
2
Investors rely on progressively more cursory disclosures to justify decisions
involving progressively more complex financial instruments. This inverse
relationship between financial innovation and understanding is not new. As I
show in Part II, it was as relevant eight decades ago as it is today.
Second, the early 1930s regulatory response to that era's financial crisis of
substantively relying on credit ratings highlights a key theoretical flaw in the
view of financial gatekeepers as reputational intermediaries. Many scholars
have argued that such intermediaries, including credit-rating agencies, survive
and prosper because they produce reliable high-quality information.3 As this
argument goes, credit-rating agencies will not recklessly or negligently issue
unreliable ratings, because if they do so they will incur reputational costs.
However, the historical evidence supports a different view of gatekeepers as
frequently providing not information, but "regulatory licenses"-the right to be
in compliance with regulation. 4 In the past, as regulation based on ratings grew,
credit-rating agencies effectively began to sell not information, but keys that
unlocked the financial markets. In simple terms, issuers bought licenses to sell
to regulated investors that could purchase only bonds rated in particular
categories, such as "investment grade."
5
Both of these historical topics-Ivar Kreuger and the cyclicality of
financial complexity on one hand, and credit ratings and regulatory licenses on
the other-are directly relevant to more recent events. Kreuger was, in many
ways, both the inventor of off-balance-sheet financing techniques and the
original Bernard L. Madoff,6 and his success was due in part to a raft of
innovative financial products that were precursors to instruments still widely
used today. Likewise, the early credit raters were ancestors to modem agencies,
and would not have prospered without the regulatory dependence that began
following the 1929 crash. Regulatory licenses, and the behavioral
overdependence on ratings that followed them, ultimately led to the creation
and growth of the financial instruments at the core of the recent crisis.
2 See FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE
FINANCIAL MARKETS 9-35 (2003).
3 See. e.g., Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 916, 934
(1998) ("In many markets, intermediaries play a certification role without any regulatory intervention.
Standard and Poor's (S&P) and Moody's, for example, certify the credit risk of company debt."); Susan
M. Phillips & Alan N. Rechtschaffen, International Banking Activities: The Role of the Federal Reserve
Bank in Domestic Capital Markets, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1754, 1762-63 (1998) ("Finally, credit
rating agencies enhance the capital markets infrastructure by distilling a great deal of information into a
single credit rating for a security. That rating reflects the informed judgment of the agency regarding the
issuer's ability to meet the terms of the obligation. Such information is frequently critical to potential
investors and could not be acquired otherwise, except at substantial cost.").
4 Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 623 (1999).
5 See, e.g., Investment Company Act, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2008) (Rule 2a-7).
6 Madoff, the chair of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, was arrested in
December 2008, and admitted to a $50 billion dollar financial pyramid scheme. See Diana B. Henriques
& Zachery Kouwe, U.S. Arrests a Top Trader in Vast Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008, at A l.
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Without financial innovation and overreliance on credit ratings, the recent
crisis likely would not have occurred, and certainly would not have been as
deep. Without financial innovation, the decline in the values of subprime
mortgage loans would not have had ripple effects throughout the banking
system, as largely undisclosed derivatives backed by those loans plummeted in
value. Likewise, without overdependence on ratings, the tranches of synthetic
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and structured investment vehicles
(SIVs) at the core of the crisis could not, and would not, have been sold. In
short, if regulators and market participants had remembered these two lessons
from history, the crisis likely could have been averted, or at least muted.
I. Ivar Kreuger and the Dark Side of Financial Innovation
From the Panic of 1907 through World War I, large U.S. corporate entities
financed their operations primarily by borrowing from creditors. During this
era, these financing transactions, like most corporate and financial contracts,
were typically simple and straightforward. For good and ill, there was little
financial innovation during this time. Market participants recalled the October
1907 suicide of Charles T. Barney, founder of the famed, and then failed,
Knickerbocker Trust Company, as well as subsequent bank runs and pandemic
fear.8 There was little interest in creating novel financial products or taking on
substantial new risks.
Then, beginning in 1922, market sentiment began to change. Corporations
shifted to securities issuance as a major source of capital. 9 In 1922, one of
Europe's most innovative business figures, Ivar Kreuger, proposed a major
securities issue to Lee Higginson, then a leading investment bank. 10 Kreuger
created a new company, International Match, with ties to his industrial holding
companies in Sweden. On October 26, 1923, Lee Higginson placed $15 million
of International Match gold debentures, one of the largest securities issues of
the year and the most widely publicized initial public offering. The Wall Street
Journal reported that "[m]uch commendation [was] expressed among bond
houses" concerning the new issues and that it was one of the "finest pieces of
bond salesmanship seen perhaps in years.""
This initial International Match issue was an early part of the 1920s shift
from banks to capital markets, and it also marked a transition to new methods
of raising capital. During the decade, Ivar Kreuger led the new push of
7 As Lawrence Mitchell has demonstrated, the foundation of the shift to individual holding
and trading of common shares was established during this early pre- I 920s period, and the instruments
typically used were simply common shares. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION
ECONOMY: How FINANCE TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY 169, 192-208 (2007).
8 See ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE PANIC OF 1907: LESSONS LEARNED FROM
THE MARKET'S PERFECT STORM ix-xiii (2007).
9 J.R. Taylor, Some Antecedents of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 16 ACCT. REV.
188, 189(1941).
10 FRANK PARTNOY, THE MATCH KING 15-29 (2009).
11 New Issues Being Carefully Priced, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1923, at 5.
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financial innovation by creating new financial products and structures. Kreuger
created new forms of financial instruments, including B Shares, with 1/1000th
of a vote, and participating debentures whose returns were derived from the
returns on other investments.' 2 The progressively complex securities issuances
from International Match began to resemble modern derivatives, including
"structured notes," complex fixed income instruments with guaranteed
principal repayment but coupons that vary based on changes in certain
variables, including gold, foreign exchange, and dividend or interest payments
by other companies.
International Match, followed by many other companies, also began using
off-shore subsidiaries and off-balance-sheet transactions to shift assets,
liabilities, income, and expenses. For example, when the funds raised from the
initial International Match gold debenture deal were finally available, Kreuger
immediately wired that money to the account of Continental Investment
Corporation, a Liechtenstein corporation he owned.13 International Match's
primary asset became the expected cash flows from a private off-balance-sheet
contract with Continental. This early deal resembled a modem swap transaction
with a related entity.
Kreuger also shifted assets to Garanta Corporation, a Holland entity that
was related to some of his other companies. Garanta acted as a kind of financial
intermediary, resembling a modem SIV. Like an SIV, Garanta held primarily
financial assets, which it purchased by issuing tranches of securities. Also like
an SIV, Garanta's assets and liabilities were not consolidated, or even reported,
in its related entities' financial statements. Until 1928, Kreuger's accountants at
Ernst & Ernst were not even aware of Garanta's existence, and Garanta's risk
exposure was never disclosed to holders of International Match securities.' 4
The relationship between Garanta and International Match was similar to the
modern relationship between financial-institution parent companies and their
subsidiaries and related entities.
As these financial methods became more complex, accountants and
auditors were pressed to play a more substantive and prominent role.
Accountants typically performed only cursory examinations of U.S.
corporations' financial statements. At the same time, legal rules did not subject
accountants to any heightened responsibility. The accounting profession
recognized the benefit they would gain if investors placed greater weight on
their examination of financial statements. This was particularly true as financial
innovation led to increasingly complex issuances of new securities.
Financial innovation made the auditors' job much more difficult, but also
potentially more profitable. It appeared at several points during the 1920s that
accountants might be subject to increased liability. In 1925, the New York
legislature considered, but did not adopt, a heightened liability standard for
12 PARTNOY, supra note 10, at 76-77.
13 Id. at 49-50.
14 Id. at 80-83.
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accountants. 15 In 1927, William Z. Ripley published Wall Street and Main
Street, an influential book arguing that the separation of ownership and control
had led corporations to engage in troubling accounting and financial practices.
Ripley argued that investment decisions had become disconnected from reality
because corporations frequently did not issue financial statements at all, and
those companies such as International Match that did issue statements included
only cursory information.16
Although some scholars point to the 1929 crash as the crucial factor in
finally motivating securities-regulation reform, historical evidence suggests that
the stock market crash did not have a transformative impact on the regulatory
agenda (with the exception of credit-rating-related regulation, as described in
Part III). Indeed, even though some accountants embraced Ripley's proposals
and attempted to pressure the New York Stock Exchange, a private corporation
that did not require audits, to implement new requirements, no action was
taken.
Part of the reason for this lack of response was that the Hoover
Administration was not inclined to implement sweeping securities regulation,
but there also was no political consensus about the causes and effects of the
stock market decline. Moreover, it appeared initially that the New York Stock
Exchange would respond adequately to the market decline. One scholar
observed that the crash "must not be overstressed as a causal factor," citing a
1930 statement from the Exchange that the economic decline was temporary
and recovery was "just around the corner."
'17
Nearly four years passed between the 1929 crash and the passage of the
Securities Act of 1933. The congressional stock exchange practices hearings,
which immediately preceded the 1933 Act, were not dominated by stories about
the crash; those memories had faded. Instead, the hearings focused on
testimony from Ivar Kreuger's accountants and bankers, and on a report from
Price Waterhouse & Co., which had investigated Kreuger's firms after his
widely reported death in March 1932.18 This testimony centered on revelations
of the scope and nature of Kreuger's financial innovations.
These hearings also included detailed questions about the oversight of
International Match and its complex relationship with various off-shore
subsidiaries and related entities.19 The congressional and public expressions of
shock that Kreuger could have disclosed so little about his financial innovations
were a primary factor that led to the adoption of the Securities Act of 1933. As
J.R. Taylor observed, "Probably the strongest activating force was the Kreuger
15 The Ultramares case, Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y.
1931), also suggested that accountant liability might be extended beyond outright fraud to include legal
responsibility for negligent actions. See Taylor, supra note 9, at 190-91.
16 WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, WALL STREET AND MAIN STREET 181-88 (1927).
17 Taylor, supra note 9, at 194.
18 Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 72d Cong. 1249-
74 (1932) (testimony of George 0. May) [hereinafter Stock Exchange Practices].
19 See id. at 1267-70.
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and Toll crash. Here was the dynamic incident that focused attention upon the
evils possible under the holding-subsidiary form of corporate enterprise, in
spite of frequent audits by competent public accountants."
2U
This focus on Ivar Kreuger during the legislative process should not be a
surprise, given the size of investor holdings in his companies and the
revelations about his innovative practices. According to some reports, his
securities were the most widely held in the world. Even within the U.S.
markets, they were among the most widely held and actively traded issues. For
example, there were $335,694,386 of foreign corporate issues floated in the
United States in 1929; of that amount, $76,148,339 was issued by Kreuger and
21Toll. In March 1932, after Kreuger's death was announced, the New York
Stock Exchange ticker could not keep pace with the number of trades of shares
22in his companies, even on a delay.
The congressional investigation into Kreuger revealed that his
manipulations would not have been possible if accountants had focused more
on International Match's related off-shore companies. For example, A.D.
Berning, the lead audit partner from Ernst & Ernst, never engaged in an audit of
Kreuger & Toll, International Match's parent company.23 Instead, Berning
relied on audits conducted by Swedish accountants. 24 The Swedish accountants
did not communicate the underlying details of Kreuger's SIV-like subsidiaries
and related entities. International Match did not have sufficiently high
ownership stakes in these entities to require consolidation on its balance sheet;
instead, its interests were indirect. Thus, International Match used "special
purpose entities" much as Enron did a decade ago, or financial institutions did
more recently.
Three keys to Kreuger's techniques were that he retained a sufficient
amount of managerial control over subsidiaries and related entities, moved
crucial economic activity to those corporations, and then restricted audits and
disclosure to U.S. entities. Again, there are parallels to today. The major banks'
SIV and super-senior CDO exposures did not appear in their financial
statements before 2008. The banks' risk exposure was housed in subsidiaries
and related entities, whose risks were not disclosed and apparently not
understood. For example, AIG did not disclose its disclose its subprime-related
credit default swap exposure until August 2007, and then it did so only in
cursory fashion. 25 Major financial institutions, such as Citigroup, disclosed only
20 Taylor, supra note 9, at 194.
21 George A. Eddy, Security Issues and Real Investment in 1929, 19 REv. ECON. STAT. 79, 82
(1937).
22 When the ticker finally caught up, it recorded the largest single trade in the history of the
markets: a sale of 673,800 American Certificates of Kreuger & Toll, Kreuger's Swedish holding
company. By the end of that day, those securities were worth just pennies. See Market Sags Here on
Kreuger Selling, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1932, at 15.
23 Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 18, at 1249-50.
24 Id. at 1250.
25 Compare AIG Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (May 10, 2007) (not detailing its credit
default swap exposure), with AIG Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 65 (Aug. 8, 2007) ("At June 30,
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minimal information about their credit default swap exposures or the risk
profiles of their super-senior synthetic CDO tranches related to subprime
mortgage loans. 26 Like Kreuger's disclosures, financial institution disclosures
did not give investors a sufficiently broad picture of aggregate risk.
Although many scholars assume the 2000s were a period of
unprecedented financial innovation, the 1920s also were an innovative time,
perhaps even more so than in recent years relative to available technology. It is
worth recalling that Adolf A. Berle, Jr., wrote his major study of corporate
finance innovation during the mid to late 1920s, when new forms of securities
were proliferating, including non-voting stock, numerous kinds of participating
preferred stock with dividends and conversion rights that varied over time, and
a variety of convertible obligations. 27 Berle's remarks on the complexity of
financial products echo more recent financial innovation.
In addition, Berle reached similar conclusions to those of many leading
financial and legal academics today. Given the financial complexity of the
time, Berle suggested reconstructing corporate law to redirect management to
the goal of serving the balanced interest of all investors, not just shareholders.
Several scholars, revisiting Berle more recently, have cited his conclusion that
the cororate objective should focus on groups of security holders other than
equity. 8 Indeed, Michael Jensen has recognized that the primary corporate
objective should be to maximize firm value, not shareholder value, as he and
others previously had propounded. 29 This lesson also can be traced back to Ivar
Kreuger, whose outside investors were predominantly holders of hybrid
securities. Likewise, the most problematic subprime-related tranches of SIVs
and CDOs, as well as many of the banks' issued securities themselves, were
hybrid claims.
2007, the notional amount of this credit derivative portfolio was $465 billion, including $64 billion from
transactions with mixed collateral that include U.S. subprime mortgages.").
26 Compare Citigroup Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 23, 2007) (not mentioning "super
senior" exposures), with Citigroup Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 22, 2008) (reporting extensively
about "super senior" exposures). Specifically, Citigroup reported in its annual filing in early 2008 that as
of December 31, 2007 it had "approximately $29.3 billion of net exposures to the super senior tranches
of CDOs which are collateralized by asset-backed securities, derivatives on asset-backed securities, or
both." Id. at 30. Citigroup's total subprime net exposures as of September 30, 2007, were reported as
$54.6 billion. Id. at 48.
27 See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE 111-13,
131-33 (1928) (describing novel types of hybrid securities issued during the 1920s).
28 See id. at 192-94; see also Albert H. Barkey, The Financial Articulation of a Fiduciary
Duty to Bondholders with Fiduciary Duties to Stockholders of the Corporation, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV.
47, 68 (1986); William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984
Wis. L. REv. 667; Alon Chaver & Jesse Fried, Managers' Fiduciary Duty upon the Firm's Insolvency:
Accounting for Performance Creditors, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1813 (2002); Jonathan R. Macey, An
Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights
of Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165 (1990).
29 Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective
Function, J. APPLED CORP. FIN., Fall 2001.
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II. 1930s Credit-Rating Agency Regulation and Early Regulatory Licenses
A second important reaction to both the 1929 crash and the collapse of
Ivar Kreuger and his related companies was the implementation of legal rules
that depended on credit ratings. Until recently, the widely shared academic
view of credit-rating agencies was that they were examples of classic
reputational intermediaries. 30 According to this view, credit-rating agencies
were information providers whose certification designations generated income
only to the extent the information was credible and valuable to market
participants; the credit-rating agencies were constrained from engaging in
fraud, or reckless or negligent behavior, by the fact that their reputations would
suffer if they did, and then they would lose business as a result.
In 1999, I introduced a different view of the credit-rating agencies as
providing, not information, but "regulatory licenses," a term I used to describe
the valuable property rights associated with the ability of a private entity, rather
than the regulator, to determine the substantive effect of legal rules.31 I
documented how the value associated with credit ratings grew, beginning in the
mid-i 970s, as regulations came increasingly to depend substantively on ratings.
Over time, some scholars have shifted from the "reputational capital" view to
the "regulatory license" view,
32 as have some legislators and regulators.
33
In the aftermath of the recent crisis, it has become apparent that the
overreliance on credit ratings was even deeper than one might assumed, based
on the effects of the grants of recent regulatory licenses. Overdependence on
credit ratings has a behavioral element, which is highly path-dependent and has
become deeply embedded in investor culture. It is expressed not only in
regulation, but also in privately created investment guidelines and policies and
the extensive use of credit ratings in financial contracts. 34 This additional
increased private reliance is related to, but not necessarily required by, the
regulatory dependence on ratings.
30 For example, Jonathan Macey has stated, "Indeed, the only reason that rating agencies are
able to charge fees at all is because the public has enough confidence in the integrity of these ratings to
find them of value in evaluating the riskiness of investments." Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street Versus
Main Street: How Ignorance, Hyperbole, and Fear Lead to Regulation, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1487, 1500
(1998); see also Partnoy, supra note 4, at 633 n.62 (citing other examples).
31 Partnoy, supra note 4, at 623.
32 For example, Jonathan Macey testified that "[m]ost Americans think that the large, well-
known credit rating organizations like Moodys and Standard & Poor's are purely private enterprises:
they are unaware of the fact that these organizations are, in fact, more properly viewed as quasi-
governmental entities." Rating the Raters: Enron and the Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 43-45 (2002) (statement of Jonathan R. Macey, J. Dupratt
White Professor of Law, Cornell Law School); see also Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: The Role of
the Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia
University Law School) (using the term "regulatory licenses").
33 See Neil Irwin, SEC Aims To Limit Credit Ratings' Influence, WASH. POST, Jun. 26, 2008,
at D03 (citing comments from SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins).
34 See, e.g., ISDA COLLATERAL SURVEY 2000, at 43, 47-48 (on file with the Yale Journal on
Regulation) (discussing use of credit ratings by private parties).
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How did such private reliance grow? One answer is that it grew as a
function of the increasing regulatory reliance in recent years. For example, SEC
Commissioner Paul Atkins has referred to "three decades" of embedding the
use of credit ratings in rules.35 That quote was a reference to the proliferation of
legal rules since 1975, when the SEC began relying on credit ratings in its net
capital requirements for broker-dealers.
36
But private reliance on ratings actually predates the 1975 broker-dealer
rules. Indeed, regulatory reliance on ratings did not begin in 1975, but rather
during the 1930s, and private reliance soon followed. The evidence of such
private-following-public reliance is widespread today, but there also is similar
evidence of this private-following-public reliance from the 1930s.
For example, following the 1929 Crash, Gustav Osterhus, an examiner at
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, proposed a system for weighting the
value of a bank's entire portfolio based on credit ratings. According to
Osterhus, regulators needed to be able to express a portfolio's "safety" or
"desirability" in a single number or letter.
37
During the early 1930s, this notion of the need for "desirability
weightings" quickly spread throughout the markets. 38 The Federal Reserve used
credit ratings in its inspection of banks. States passed rules distinguishing
between "legal" and "illegal" investments based on credit ratings. High ratings
became effective conditions for state-chartered banks to be members of the
Federal Reserve System.39 In 1931, the U.S. Treasury Department and
Comptroller of the Currency jointly adopted credit ratings as a measure of the
quality of banks' bond accounts: bonds rated BBB or higher could be carried at
cost, whereas lower-rated bonds had to be written off.
40
During the 1930s, ratings became progressively more important and
valuable. Regulators obviously appreciated being able to delegate responsibility
to credit-rating agencies, and the agencies likewise appreciated how much more
profitable their rating businesses became, particularly during the Great
Depression. Then, on February 15, 1936, the Comptroller made his most
radical proposal, to define "investment securities" based explicitly on the
ratings of "not less than two rating manuals."
41
35 Paul S. Atkins, Comm'r, SEC, Remarks to 7th German Corporate Governance Code
Conference: Corporate Governance in USA Against Background of Recent Developments (June 27,
2008).
36 See Partnoy, supra note 4, at 690-91.
37 See Gustav Osterhus, Flaw-Tester for Bond Lists, AM. BANKERS ASSN. J., Aug. 1931, at
67; see also GILBERT HAROLD, BOND RATINGS AS AN INVESTMENT GUIDE: AN APPRAISAL OF THEIR
EFFECTIVENESS 160-72 (1938) (describing the application of these desirability weights to 1931
investment portfolios).
38 See HAROLD, supra note 37, at 18-26.
39 See id. at 26 (citing Conditions of Membership in the Federal Reserve System, at 1
(mimeographed bulletin, Fed. Reserve Bd., Washington, 1933)).
40 This ruling received wide attention at the time, including a front-page article in the Wall
Street Journal. See 75% of Bank Bond Valuations Safe, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1931, at 1.
41 Specifically, the Comptroller's ruled that:
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This ruling had a dramatic effect. More than half of the roughly two
thousand publicly-traded bond issues suddenly failed the Comptroller's new
definition of "investment securities," and therefore could no longer be held by
banks. 2 Market participants protested that the ruling was a mistake. It was
unfair to smaller corporations, whose bonds had lower ratings. It lured banks
into a false sense of security that they could hold a highly rated bond. The
Missouri Bankers Association warned: "We further believe that the delegation
to these private rating agencies of the judgment as to what constitutes a sound
investment is unprecedented in our history and wholly unwarranted by their
records in the past."
43
Even the Comptroller seemed to recognize the potentially perverse effects
of the ruling. On May 22, 1936, he made the following remarks in a speech
before the California Bankers Association:
The responsibility for proper investment of bank funds, now, as in the past, rests
with the Directors of the institution, and there has been and is no intention on the
part of this office to delegate this responsibility to the rating services, or in any
way to intimate that this responsibility may be considered as having been fully
performed by the mere ascertaining that a particular security falls within a
particular rating classification.
4 4
Unfortunately, the Comptroller's intentions rapidly became irrelevant.
What mattered was not what the Comptroller had thought, but what the rating
agencies said. One short-term effect of the ruling was to make the banks'
investments safer, because they no longer could hold bonds rated lower than
BBB. However, the longer-term effects were more perverse. In the future, bond
prices and yields would not necessarily match ratings quality. Non-member
banks could profit from buying underpriced non-investment-grade bonds.45
Conversely, member banks could now seek the riskiest BBB-rated bonds, with
the highest yields. Ironically, the lowest-quality BBB-rated bonds had the
highest relative value. Ratings became not only a crutch, but an opportunity.
Not surprisingly, ratings became much more common during the
following years. Within a few years after the Comptroller's ruling, Gilbert
By virtue of the authority vested in the Comptroller of the Currency by ... Paragraph Seventh
of Section 5136 of the Revised Statutes, the following regulation is promulgated as to further
limitations and restrictions on the purchase and sale of investment securities for the bank's
own account, supplemental to the specific limitations and restrictions of the statute.... (3)
The purchase of "investment securities" in which the investment characteristics are distinctly
and predominantly speculative, or "investment securities" of a lower designated standard than
those which are distinctly and predominantly speculative is prohibited .... The terms
employed herein may be found in recognized rating manuals, and where there is doubt as to
the eligibility of a security for purchase, such eligibility must be supported by not less than
two rating manuals.
HAROLD, supra note 37, at 30.
42 Id. at 31.
43 See id. at 32 (citing Resolution of the Missouri Bankers Association at its 46th Annual
Convention, May 5, 1936).
44 Id. at 32 (citing J.F.T. O'Connor, Comptroller of the Currency, Address at a Convention of
the California Bankers Association, May 22, 1936).
45 Id. at 33.
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Harold wrote, "It is unanimously asserted by the rating agencies that the use of
bond ratings today is greater than ever before and that the use of and reliance
on the ratings is growing year by year.''46 Meanwhile, the increased reliance on
ratings reduced the reputational constraints on credit-rating agencies. Rating
agencies became more important and more profitable, not necessarily because
they generated more valuable information, but because they began selling more
valuable regulatory licenses.
Over time, as the reliance on ratings took hold, ratings became part of
investing culture. "AAA" and "BBB" became enmeshed in financial
vocabulary, so much so that it quickly seemed impossible for many market
participants to perform basic functions without referring to credit ratings. Yet
those labels have been, and are, merely mnemonic devices, with no inherent
meaning. They are a short-hand for credit quality, and truly represent implicit
estimates of three key variables: probability of default, expected payoff in the
event of default, and (for structured finance and more complex assets) the
correlation of defaults. The 1930s rules suggested to institutional investors and
banks that they did not need to make careful judgments about these variables,
but instead could rely on letter ratings. As private reliance on ratings grew,
private actors focused more on letter ratings than on the underlying credit
analysis, such as the expected probability of default.
Harold predicted the dysfunctional behavior that would arise in response.
Indeed, his comments eerily foretold the development of subprime related
CDOs and SIVs. He predicted that institutional investors who were restricted to
the highest-grade bonds would be encouraged to look for other types of
investments with higher potential returns, and that "[t]his may stimulate still
further developments in such fields as real estate mortgages, etc. ' '47 At first, the
search frequently ended with corporate bonds and loans, which were
repackaged into CDOs. But during the early 1990s, and then most notably
during the mid-2000s, these other tyes of investments stretched to include
"such fields as real estate mortgages."
Behavioral and regulatory overdependence on ratings created incentives
for bond issuers to obtain ratings before bonds were issued. Issuers were forced
to look to rating agencies as authoritative, even if they did not generate
valuable information. Moreover, they looked to the rating agencies to create
new instruments that captured particular ratings. General Electric needed to
maintain its AAA rating. Banks needed to remain in the single-A category. The
incentives for ratings-driven transactions were accelerated by the agencies'
shift from investor-pay to issuer-pay. Still, even without the obvious conflicts
of interest associated with issuer-pay, pressures to generate and maintain high
ratings would remain.
46 Id. at 35.
47 Id. at 33.
48 Id.
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Over time, private use of credit ratings grew to mimic regulatory use.
Swap agreements contained provisions triggering payment or posting of
collateral in the event of downgrades. Lending documents included provisions
related to credit ratings. Institutional investment guidelines incorporated credit
ratings. Instead of using judgment to assess credit risk or even looking to key
measures of credit risk--especially probability of default-private actors
simply relied on ratings.
The subprime crisis can be seen, as Harold warned, as an effort by
investors, banks, and the credit-rating agencies to create highly rated securities
that were significantly riskier than warranted by the ratings. The key
mechanisms for creating these instruments were mathematical models and
assumptions, particularly about the correlation of defaults. Financial innovation
dovetailed with overdependence on ratings to generate trillions of dollars of
highly-rated tranches of CDOs and SIVs that appeared safe, but were not. One
key message for regulators, as they assess the crisis, must be to eliminate
regulatory dependence on credit ratings, and to undertake efforts, perhaps even
some forms of "shock therapy," to discourage private actors from relying
exclusively on credit ratings.
Fortunately, a simple substitute for credit ratings is available: market
measures of credit risk. Credit spreads and credit default swap prices provide
reliable and robust estimates of credit risk. These market measures are far more
accurate and prescient as estimates of default. Moreover, prices impound
market estimates of expected recovery and default correlations. Indeed, credit-
rating agencies could improve their accuracy by relying more on market
measures, and they are beginning to do precisely that. For regulators or private
actors that are concerned about volatility, there are straightforward ways to use
market measures for investment decisions in more stable ways, based on rolling
averages of market prices.
Of course, requiring the use of a particular market measure might also
create perverse regulatory licenses. One way to encourage the use of market
measures would be to indicate that reliance on credit ratings would not be
enforceable, and to substitute something like "judgment" in the decision
process. 49 Then, regulated entities would need to examine credit risk and decide
which bonds to buy and hold based on their own choices about which measures
of information are most reliable, market-based or otherwise. Simply deferring
to credit ratings would be the weakest of available alternatives.
The above historical evidence supplements, but does not fundamentally
change, the emerging "regulatory license" view of credit ratings. Regulators
and private actors should acknowledge that the overdependence on credit
ratings is entrenched, in large part because of regulatory reliance, but also
49 The SEC's proposed rules removing regulatory reliance on NRSRO ratings would do just
that, substituting reliance on judgment for reliance on ratings. See References to Ratings of Nationally
Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,327, 73 Fed.
Reg. 70,124 (proposed July 1, 2008). Unfortunately, as of June 10, 2009, the SEC had not implemented
this proposed rule.
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because of the path-dependent behavior of private parties who have come to
depend on ratings. These parties should resist the use of credit ratings and adopt
market-based substitutes instead. Moreover, in responding to the financial
crisis, regulators should heed the lessons of history and avoid implementing




Unlike science or the arts, financial history does not seem to build
incrementally. Financial knowledge often requires a real-life experience or
connection, and is not necessarily motivated by historical lessons. Instead of
amassing knowledge over time, market participants learn about the cycles of
informational asymmetry and regulatory licenses anew, generation by
generation.
During the 1930s, market actors became well aware of the dangers of
financial innovation and related informational gaps. A primary source of their
knowledge was Ivar Kreuger. Likewise, investors and even some regulators
warned during the 1930s about regulatory reliance on credit ratings. Yet several
decades later, that awareness was gone, and regulatory reliance remained. Over
time, Ivar Kreuger became an unknown, and the deleterious consequences of
regulatory licenses were wiped from the memories of investors and regulators.
The point of this Essay is to remind scholars that not all bad ideas are new, and
that, at least with respect to narrow issues addressed here, some of the core
causes of the recent crisis have deep historical roots.
50 For example, the Treasury Department has implemented bank "stress testing." See Treasury
Department, Financial Stability Plan Fact Sheet, http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/fact-sheet.pdf
(last visited Apr. 26, 2009). Appointing one or two private entities to perform such testing based on
some specified scale might generate some of the same perverse consequences as legal rules that
delegated the assessment of credit quality to rating agencies.

